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REDEEMING AND LIVING WITH EVIL 
MARK A. GRABER∗
Self-centered scholars and fading actresses declare, “Enough 
about me.  Let’s talk about you.  What do you think of me?”  This 
symposium is dedicated to talking about Sanford Levinson’s Constitu-
tional Faith
 
1  and Jack Balkin’s Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith 
in an Unjust World.2  The first is a time-honored classic.  The second is 
what ESPN calls an instant classic.  The essays in this collection justly 
celebrate each work for its distinctive contributions to the American 
constitutional enterprise.  This more selfish essay explores what Bal-
kin and Levinson think of me in general and Dred Scott and the Problem 
of Constitutional Evil in particular.3
The justification/rationalization for this pathetic display of ego is 
that all three works emphasize the problem of constitutional evil.  
Constitutional evil provides the central challenge to both constitu-
tional redemption and constitutional faith.  Balkin declares, “The 
problem of constitutional evil is the possibility that the Constitution, 
as it operates in practice, permits or even requires great injustice.”  
This problem, he writes, “haunts us and threatens our constitutional 
faith.”
 
4  Levinson, while not using the phrase “constitutional evil,” 
meditates on how the Constitution can be an object of faith given the 
perceived injustices constantly justified in the name of the Constitu-
tion.  His constitutional faith requires “a renewed dedication to . . . 
the Constitution as an ever-living presence encouraging the estab-
lishment of a more perfect Union committed above all to the realiza-
tion of justice and the blessings of liberty.”5
 
Copyright © 2012 by Mark A. Graber. 
  He unsurprisingly re-
gards the “constitutionally legitimized presence in American history” 
of chattel slavery as “the most difficult problem presented those who 
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would celebrate the Constitution.”6  Just as Grant is buried in Grant’s 
tomb, so Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil elaborates on 
the problem of constitutional evil.  This problem, the introduction 
states, “concerns the practice and theory of sharing civic space with 
people committed to evil practices or pledging allegiance to a consti-
tutional text and tradition saturated with concessions to evil.”7
Constitutional Redemption and Constitutional Faith understand the 
problem of constitutional evil quite differently than Dred Scott and the 
Problem of Constitutional Evil.  Balkin and Levinson regard constitu-
tional redemption and faith as rooted in the possibility that Ameri-
cans will eventually defeat evil.  Constitutional Evil takes the far more 
pessimistic view that evil will never be defeated.  Constitutional faith 
and redemption in our permanently fallen state is rooted in the pos-
sibility that Americans will find ways of living with each other peacea-
bly knowing that the price of union is the continual obligation to 
make what the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison described as “a co-
venant with death, and an agreement with hell.”
  All 
three works regard slavery as the quintessential constitutional evil, al-
though each recognizes the omnipresence of different constitutional 
evils in the contemporary constitutional regime. 
8
These different perspectives on constitutional evil can be exagge-
rated.  Balkin and Levinson recognize that the official Constitution 
sanctions a good many unjust practices.  Our constitutional faith re-
quires us to live with these evils at present in the unproven hope that 
such injustices are on what Lincoln maintained was “a course of ulti-
mate extinction.”
   
9  Constitutional Evil would not have Americans ab-
andon aspirationalist perspectives on the constitutional order.  “As 
long as constitutional institutions yield policies that protect vital in-
terests,” the book asserts, “citizens are free to use all constitutional 
means to make the Constitution ‘the best it can be.’”10
Nevertheless, as the very titles suggest, Constitutional Faith and 
Constitutional Redemption have a fundamentally different perspective 
on the American constitutional project than Constitutional Evil.  Balkin 
and Levinson see that constitutional project as committed to redeem-
ing us from evil, either though constitutional interpretation or consti-
   
 
 6. Id. at 186. 
 7. GRABER, supra note 3, at 1. 
 8. See WALTER M. MERRILL, AGAINST WIND AND TIDE: A BIOGRAPHY OF WM. LLOYD 
GARRISON 205 (1963). 
 9. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Cincinnati, Ohio (Sept. 17, 1859), in 3 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 454–55 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).   
 10. GRABER, supra note 3, at 251. 
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tutional change.  Constitutional Evil sees that constitutional project as 
committed to finding ways of learning to live with evil, either because 
we are unlikely ever to be redeemed from evil or because redemption 
is too distant in the future to make the Balkin/Levinson project of 
overwhelming interest to the living. 
Part I of this Essay elaborates and strengthens the case Balkin, in 
particular, makes for constitutional redemption.  Constitutional Re-
demption offers the best and most sober perspective on how the Con-
stitution promotes complicity with perceived injustice and blinds citi-
zens to the degree of constitutional evil in the United States.  Worse, 
constitutional evils in the United States are almost always the conse-
quences of “really rotten bargains.”  Unlike rotten bargains, which 
merely deny fundamental human rights, really rotten bargains are 
agreements between A and B to deprive C of fundamental rights.  
Such agreements are “really rotten” because A derives benefits from 
the bargain, even though A (although perhaps not B) acknowledges 
that C is being deprived of fundamental rights.  The case for redeem-
ing a constitutional order from these kinds of constitutional evils is far 
greater than the need to purify a constitutional order in which each 
party imposes a constitutional evil on the other in return for benefits 
that the other party believes unjust. 
Part II explains why constitutional faith and redemption may 
nevertheless entail enduring accommodations for constitutional evils.  
Faith and redemption are more complicated than Constitutional Re-
demption suggests.  The fans of very bad baseball teams are often de-
scribed as faithful, even though they recognize their team is unlikely 
to improve.  What marriage partners do when they pledge faith to 
each other has changed over time.  Constitutional faith and redemp-
tion similarly depend on the point of the constitutional project.  The 
Preamble to the Constitution makes clear that the constitutional 
project has multiple purposes.  The constitutional commitment to 
“establish justice” commits Americans to eradicating constitutional 
evil.  The constitutional commitment to “provide for the common de-
fense” may commit Americans to accommodate constitutional evil.  
The constitutional commitment to “secure the Blessings of Liberty to 
ourselves and our Posterity” may even compel Americans to make evil 
constitutional discriminations. 
The constitutional commitments set out in the Preamble are not 
ordered.   Americans are as constitutionally obligated to “provide for 
the common defense” as they are to “establish justice.”  Contemporary 
constitutional theory has been too obsessed with the latter at the ex-
pense of the former.  One problem with this constitutional obsession 
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with justice is the refusal to treat as constitutional the compromises 
necessary to achieve other constitutional purposes.  The more serious 
problem, which has become a central theme in Levinson’s most re-
cent work, is a failure to do any serious analysis of whether constitu-
tional institutions remain good vehicles for achieving such constitu-
tional purposes as the common defense.11
I.  REDEEMING THE CONSTITUTION 
 
A.  Redeeming Constitutional Evils 
Chapter 5 of Constitutional Redemption offers a profound medita-
tion on constitutional evil.  Balkin’s specific concern is the possibility 
that “fidelity” to the Constitution “is undesirable because it co-opts us 
into the maintenance of an unjust order.”12  “If the Constitution, or 
parts of it, permits or even requires great evils,” he asks, “why does it 
deserve our fidelity, and what does the practice of pledging faith in it 
do to us.”13
Balkin’s analysis begins with the possibility that theories of consti-
tutional interpretation provide an adequate remedy for the problem 
of constitutional evil.  Constitutional Redemption notes the common 
  This emphasis on “what the practice of pledging faith in 
it do[es] to us” highlights the ethical dimension of constitutional 
faith.  The religious problem of evil is ontological.  How can we be-
lieve a just, all-powerful God exists in the face of apparent injustice.  
Religious leaders frequently insist that we may not fully understand 
divine ways and means, but few claim that adherents must do what is 
really evil should God command injustice.  A deity who commanded 
injustice would not be worthy of worship and obedience.  The prob-
lem of constitutional evil is normative.  No one questions that the 
Constitution of the United States exists.  The concern is the grounds 
on which we can pledge allegiance and obedience to a constitution 
when doing so compels us to participate in various constitutional 
evils.  If we do not obey Baal’s command for human sacrifice, why 
should opponents of capital punishment regard as binding the Eighth 
Amendment if that provision sanctions the death penalty? 
 
 11. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE 
CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE (2012) [hereinafter LEVINSON, FRAMED]; SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR 
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE 
THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006) [hereinafter LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION]; Sanford Levinson, How I Lost My Constitutional Faith, 71 MD. L. REV. 956 
(2012). 
 12. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 107. 
 13. Id. at 109. 
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tendency to deny constitutional injustice by propounding what Balkin 
aptly calls “the shadow Constitution.”  This is “the Constitution that 
would exist if it were rightly interpreted, a Constitution that strips and 
purifies existing constitutional law of its defects and shortsighted-
ness.”14  Religious adherents claim that apparent divine injustices in 
sacred texts are only metaphors.  Constitutional adherents explain 
that apparent constitutional evils stem from misreading constitutional 
scripture.  Properly interpreted, Baal does not command human sa-
crifice and the Eighth Amendment does not sanction the death pe-
nalty.  The liberal shadow Constitution prohibits capital punishment, 
mandates same-sex marriage, and gives Congress the power to pass 
the Affordable Care Act.  The conservative shadow Constitution gives 
states the power to ban abortion, prohibits all affirmative action, and 
denies congressional power to pass the Affordable Care Act.  Both the 
contemporary liberal and the contemporary conservative shadow 
Constitutions provided little or no protection to slaveholders during 
the 1840s and 1850s.  The slaveholder shadow Constitution of 1850, 
of course, provided greater protections to human bondage than Jack-
sonian constitutional authorities.15
The problem with this solution to the problem of constitutional 
evil, Balkin understands, is that Americans may evade their complicity 
in constitutional evil by misidentifying “the real or true Constitution 
with a shadow Constitution that has never existed.”
  Evil, these proponents of religious 
and constitutional orthodoxy agree, results from persons being un-
faithful to the true text and not from inherent flaws in their religion 
or the Constitution of the United States. 
16
 
 14. Id. at 113. 
  Participation in 
a faith community entails responsibility for what that community has 
done and is presently doing.  Baal worshippers are part of a commu-
nity that practices human sacrifice, even if some believe that Baal does 
not actually command that ritual.  Persons who profess constitutional 
faith are part of a community that has sanctioned slavery, engaged in 
racial apartheid, silenced political dissenters, and justified numerous 
other injustices in the name of the Constitution.  Balkin correctly 
notes, “The practice of fidelity to the Constitution . . . cannot be fully 
separated from what the Constitution has been used to justify or per-
 15. See CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 658–59 (1860) (speech of Jefferson Davis) 
(claiming Congress had a constitutional obligation to pass a slave code for the territories); 
United States v. Haun, 26 F. Cas. 227 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1860) (No. 15,329) (rejecting slave-
holding claims that congressional power over the importation of slaves be narrowly inter-
preted). 
 16. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 119. 
 1078 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1073 
mit in the past and what it is currently used to justify or permit.”17
Constitutional fidelity is particularly troublesome when Ameri-
cans consciously or subconsciously judge best political practices in 
light of constitutional standards.  If proponents of the shadow Consti-
tution are guilty of adjusting the meaning of constitutional provisions 
to fit some desirable conception of justice, many of their fellow citi-
zens stand accused of adjusting conceptions of justice to fit the Con-
stitution.  Felix Frankfurter identified this problem when he de-
scribed as “a great enemy of liberalism” the American “tendency . . . 
to make constitutionality synonymous with wisdom, to regard a law as 
all right it if is constitutional.”
  
Contemporary liberals pledge allegiance to a Constitution that pre-
sently sanctions the death penalty.  Contemporary conservatives 
pledge allegiance to a Constitution that presently sanctions abortion.  
The problem of constitutional evil concerns the justification for com-
plicity in these putative, unjust practices. 
18
Fidelity to the Constitution combined with the general rec-
ognition that the Constitution protected slavery during the 
antebellum period probably led many to believe that slavery, 
although an evil, was not so great an evil that it had to be 
abolished immediately, and that a compromise of some sort 
could be struck with the South and its “peculiar institu-
tion.”
  Balkin elaborates on this theme:   
19
If the Supreme Court does not interpret the Constitution as protect-
ing basic necessities,
   
20 then maybe persons have no fundamental hu-
man right to adequate food, clothing, and shelter.21
Constitutions distort American conceptions of good governing 
institutions as well as American ideals of justice. Levinson points out 
that one consequence of constitutional faith is that Americans instinc-
tively regard such constitutional processes as the Electoral College 
and equal state representation in the Senate as having virtues that are 
discerned by no other constitutional regime.
 
22
 
 17. Id. at 118. 
  The new edition of 
Constitutional Faith concludes:  
 18. W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 670 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting). 
 19. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 134. 
 20. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
 21. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, The Clintonification of American Law: Abortion, Welfare, and 
Liberal Constitutional Theory, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 731 (1997). 
 22. See LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 11; LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 11. 
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It is impossible . . . for me not to believe that this move to-
ward “fundamentalist inerrancy” on the part of many of 
those with excess “constitutional faith” is both intellectually 
indefensible and, more importantly, a potential threat to our 
future as a nation in that it stifles the possibility of necessary 
forward-looking reforms that are self-consciously willing to jet-
tison many aspects of our constitutional past.23
This constitutional complacency, Levinson and Balkin agree, fa-
cilitates unnecessary constitutional accommodations for evil and, 
worse, blinds Americans to the extent of contemporary constitutional 
evil (or stupidity).
   
24
Constitutional fidelity may nevertheless be justified because of 
what the Constitution might someday become.  Levinson famously 
adopted this position when deciding to affix his name to the Constitu-
tion displayed in Philadelphia during the Bicentennial Celebration.  
After a wonderful discourse on what signing entails, Levinson con-
cludes, “I was ultimately compelled to add my signature by the memo-
ry of Frederick Douglass and his willingness to embrace the Constitu-
tion.”
 
25  In sharp contrast to most abolitionists, Douglass insisted the 
Constitution condemned slavery.  “The Constitution, as well as the 
Declaration of Independence, and the sentiments of the founders of 
the Republic,” Douglass declared when responding to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford,26 “give us a platform broad 
enough, and strong enough, to support the most comprehensive 
plans for the freedom and elevation of all the people of this country, 
without regard to color, class, or clime.”27  Douglass’s “ability to speak 
in terms of the Constitution—and to stretch the sense of constitution-
al possibility,” Levinson writes, “helped to overcome my genuine 
doubts.”28
Famously, Levinson has partly recanted that signature because he 
no longer believes the Constitution is an adequate instrument for se-
curing the blessings of liberty.
   
29
 
 23. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 
  While Levinson remains confident 
that the rights provisions in what he calls the “Constitution of Conver-
1, at 254–55. 
 24. See generally CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES (William 
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998). 
 25. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 1, at 192. 
 26. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 27. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 344, 350 (Philip S. Foner 
ed., 1999). 
 28. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 1, at 192. 
 29. LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 5. 
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sation” can be interpreted to protect such fundamental rights as the 
right to same-sex marriage, he vigorously maintains that the provi-
sions describing the institutions in the “Constitution of Settlement” 
are both “indisputable” and anachronistic.30  American constitutional 
institutions, he maintains, have lost their capacity to establish justice 
and facilitate other worthy constitutional goals.31  Levinson’s after-
word to the new edition of Constitutional Faith states, “the Constitution 
of Settlement serves to make difficult, if not impossible, the achieve-
ment of the magnificent vision in the altogether commendable 
Preamble.”32
Balkin is more optimistic.  Both he and Levinson agree that con-
stitutional faith must be rooted in future possibilities rather than 
present realities.  Balkin declares, “Fidelity is activity, process, coming 
into being.”
 
33
[A]spirationalism begins with the problem of constitutional 
evil, viewing it as a basic condition of politics that must per-
petually be overcome, often at great cost.  At the same time, 
aspirationalism holds that despite constitutional evil, ade-
quate resources for constitutional redemption exist: in the 
text of the Constitution, in the multiple layers of the consti-
tutional tradition, and in the moral aspirations and com-
mitments of the people who live under the Constitution and 
carry the project of self-governance forward through time.
  Balkin’s constitutional commitment is to a more just 
future constitutional order and to the possibility that the present 
Constitution contains the means necessary for challenging and even-
tually eradicating existing constitutional evils.  In sharp contrast to the 
proponent of a shadow Constitution, who merely believes that the 
Constitution might be better interpreted, Balkin insists that constitu-
tional faith requires Americans to believe that the Constitution will be 
interpreted more justly over time.  Constitutional Redemption states: 
34
Unlike Levinson, Balkin retains the faith in a just constitutional 
future.  He ends his mediation on constitutional evil, appropriately, 
with a sermon on constitutional possibilities and risks: 
 
 
 30. LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 11, at 19. 
 31. See Sanford Levinson, How I Lost My Constitutional Faith, 71 MD. L. REV. 956, 966 
(2012) (stating that the “structural provisions of the Constitution, for better and, I believe, 
very much for worse, make it nearly impossible to pass legislation that truly addresses the 
major problems of our time”). 
 32. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 1, at 251. 
 33. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 119. 
 34. Id. at 120–21. 
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I . . . want to believe in the Constitution.  I want to remain 
faithful to it, and I want others in the legal profession, gov-
ernment administrators, legislators, and judges to remain 
faithful to it as well.  I am deeply saddened and troubled 
when they betray it and its promises, when they trample on 
its letter and its spirit for political advantage and personal 
gain.  I believe, moreover, that the Constitution is more than 
its positive law, that the Constitution has not yet been re-
deemed, and I hope every day for its eventual redemption.  I 
know that many who read these words join me in this hope.  
But as you, and I, and all of us expound our faith in the 
Constitution, we must also understand what our faith does to 
us.  We must recognize that fidelity to the Constitution has a 
power over us, that fidelity is not only legitimate but that it 
also legitimates.  When we discuss fidelity, we are not discuss-
ing a property of interpretation but a predicament of hu-
man existence.  To be faithful is to gamble, and the stakes 
we offer are not our property, but our integrity, not only our 
lives and fortunes, but our sacred honor.  Let us have faith 
then, but let us have faith that our faith is not in vain.35
Amen. 
 
B.   Redeeming Really Rotten Constitutional Bargains 
Amen is particularly appropriate because most constitutional 
evils are the product of “really rotten compromises.”  Rotten com-
promises are conventionally understood as agreements “to establish 
or maintain an inhuman regime, a regime of cruelty and humiliation, 
that is a regime that does not treat humans as humans.”36
 
 35. Id. at 138 
  Really rot-
ten compromises have a second characteristic.  They are compromises 
in which the crucial parties to the constitutional bargain agree that 
the price of union will be the sacrifice of what at least some parties 
recognize to be the fundamental rights of non-participants in the ne-
gotiating process.  Rotten constitutional bargains occur when A and B 
agree that B will make some concessions to A in return for being con-
stitutionally permitted to deny A what A regards as fundamental 
rights.  Really rotten constitutional bargains occur when A and B 
agree that B will be permitted to deny what A regards as some of C’s 
fundamental rights if B makes other concessions to A.  The Constitu-
tion of 1787 was a really rotten constitutional compromise.  Many 
 36. AVISHAI MARGALIT, ON COMPROMISE AND ROTTEN COMPROMISES 2 (2009). 
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Americans who recognized that slavery was an inhuman practice nev-
ertheless agreed to tolerate African-American slavery in order to se-
cure the “blessings” of union and, with respect to the free states, cer-
tain constitutional provisions that favored commercial enterprises. 
The common assertion that “rotten compromises are not al-
lowed, even for the sake of peace”37
The 2005 Constitution of Iraq is a good example of a rotten bar-
gain that is not a really rotten bargain, particularly with respect to 
provisions on the rights of women.  Women, women’s rights groups, 
and various forces committed to gender equality participated in draft-
ing the most recent Constitution of Iraq.  Their efforts helped secure 
provisions recognizing gender equality and mandating an electoral 
system likely to result in women holding one-quarter of all seats in the 
national legislature.  Religious fundamentalists committed to tradi-
tional gender roles were also crucial parties during the constitutional 
bargaining.  They secured constitutional provisions that recognized 
both the authority of Sharia and the authority of local clerics to in-
terpret Sharia on most matters of family law.
 seems mistaken when the com-
promise in question is not “really” rotten.  For historical or other rea-
sons, people may find themselves in circumstances in which they have 
very good reasons to make constitutional bargains with others they be-
lieve are committed to “an inhuman regime.”  Iraq may be a good ex-
ample.  If neither Shite nor Sunni nor Kurd is permitted to pledge al-
legiance to a constitution that contains what each believes is a fair 
degree of constitutional evil, then a fair probability exists that no Iraqi 
Constitution will likely survive for any period of time.  Persons in this 
awful situation should be allowed to bargain with their rights, agree-
ing to be treated in ways they may think of as inhuman in return for 
being permitted to treat others in ways that the others regard as in-
human.   
38
The really rotten bargain Americans reached in 1787–1789 is 
quite different than the merely rotten bargain Iraqis reached in 2005.  
The American bargain was rotten in the obvious sense that slavery is 
an “inhuman regime . . . that does not treat humans as humans.”
  Each side to the con-
stitutional bargain believes their rights were damaged by provisions 
the other side regarded as securing their fundamental interests. 
39
 
 37. Id. at 1. 
  As 
 38. This paragraph relies heavily on Olivia St. Clair, Building Backwards: Helping Heal 
Iraq Through Women’s Rights, 19 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 81, 81–85 (2010); Shiva Falsafi, Civil 
Society and Democracy in Japan, Iran, Iraq and Beyond, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 357, 428–33 
(2010). 
 39. MARGALIT, supra note 36, at 2. 
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important, American slaves were not represented when constitutional 
protections for slavery were negotiated.  At least some prominent Ira-
qi women appear to have concluded that women were better off un-
der the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 than under other politically feasible 
alternatives, including an Iraq in which agreement on a constitution 
could not be reached.  No African-American representative con-
cluded, rotten as the constitutional bargain was, that slaves were bet-
ter off “in” a Union in which slavery was no longer legal in some states 
than in a regime in which few questioned the legality or morality of 
slavery.   
Really rotten constitutional bargains produce more troubling 
constitutional evils than merely rotten constitutional bargains.  Jeremy 
Waldron’s analysis of “the circumstances of politics” suggests that 
merely rotten constitutional bargains are sometimes an inevitable fea-
ture of the human condition.  The circumstances of politics occur 
when there is a “felt need among members of a certain group for a 
common decision or course of action on some matter, even in the 
face of disagreement about what that framework, decision, or action 
should be.”40
Really rotten constitutional bargains are likely to be more unjust 
than merely rotten constitutional bargains made in the circumstances 
of politics.  The participants in merely rotten constitutional bargains 
have self-interested reasons for minimizing the extent of constitution-
al evil they will suffer when the constitution is ratified and maximizing 
the benefits obtained for those concessions.  Fundamentalist clerics in 
Iraq unduly influence family law at present, but their authority may be 
weakened in the long run if the constitutional price for that accom-
modation, substantial female representation in the national legisla-
  The principle that no one should obey an unjust bar-
gain, under these conditions, may prevent an agreement that all par-
ties agree guarantees more rights than the status quo.  By comparison, 
people are rarely if ever forced into circumstances in which they must 
make really rotten bargains, bargains between A and B that deprive 
what A and C agree are C’s fundamental rights.  Even if B will not bar-
gain with C, A will usually retain the option of consulting with C be-
fore reaching agreement with B.  Put differently, neither party to a 
merely rotten bargain may self-consciously demand constitutional evil.  
The constitutional evils that occur are simply consequences of severe 
disputes over justice.  By comparison, at least one party to a really rot-
ten bargain is self-consciously agreeing to impose a constitutional evil 
on a non-participant. 
 
 40. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 102 (1999). 
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ture, is paid in full.  Self-interest does not, however, mitigate the con-
stitutional evils sanctioned by really rotten bargains.  Because A is not 
personally affected by the constitutional evil to be inflicted on C, A 
may be unlikely to minimize the nature of that evil, be unduly re-
signed to the intractability of that evil, or trade away that evil too 
lightly.  Even if abolishing slavery in 1787 was impossible, Framers 
who had every incentive to avoid the overseer’s lash would likely have 
reached a better constitutional bargain than northern delegates all 
too willing to look the other way in order to secure different blessings 
of union. 
Really rotten bargains that permit A and B to do what A and C 
believe is an injustice to C are a particular concern for contemporary 
constitutionalism.  American constitutional evils in the present do not 
appear to be as heinous as the constitutional evils of the past.  Putting 
aside the case of abortion, which may be genocide if the unborn have 
the same right to life as the born,41 most contested contemporary 
constitutional practices in the United States and other constitutional 
democracies42
These ruminations on really rotten constitutional bargains but-
tress Balkin’s call to be hypersensitive to the both the duty and risks of 
constitutional fidelity and redemption.  The legal elites who read ar-
ticles in the Maryland Law Review have a special constitutional obliga-
 do not seem as vicious as slavery, even to their oppo-
nents.  Gay and lesbian citizens lead far more human lives than most 
slaves, even when they are not permitted to marry.  Forcing people to 
endure public prayer in schools or refusing to allow public prayer in 
public schools is a quite different violation of religious freedom than 
throwing people in gas ovens because they worship the wrong rock or 
the right rock in the wrong way.  Rather, what may concern many 
progressive constitutionalists is how perceived power discrepancies in-
fluence constitutional and political bargaining.  When rich Democrats 
compromise with rich Republicans on a series of tax and spending 
cuts that deprive the poor of vital resources that most rich Democrats 
believe to be an injustice to the poor, the problem is less that the 
present tax code is an inhuman system, but the ways in which the 
campaign finance system may limit the capacity of poorer Americans 
to participate in budgetary processes.  
 
 41. Many pro-life advocates insist abortion is a form of genocide.  See Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, Paulsen, J., Dissenting, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S 
TOP LEGAL EXPERTS RELATE AMERICA'S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 196, 211–14  
(Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005). 
 42. Constitutional theocracies present different problems.  See RAN HIRSCHL, 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY (2010). 
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tion to minimize constitutional evil because, in large part, constitu-
tional evils are injuries we impose on others in order to obtain bene-
fits for ourselves.  Convinced that we cannot end slavery, we agree to 
provide some accommodation for human bondage in order to in-
crease our commercial prosperity.  Recognizing that the Supreme 
Court will not guarantee rights to basic necessities, our constitutional 
theories begin to focus more on the reproductive and intimacy rights 
favored by affluent citizens than providing the less fortunate the re-
sources they need to survive.43  The free speech law we celebrate pro-
vides far greater protections for those who use private resources to 
speak than persons who require public spaces or funds to gain access 
to the marketplace of ideas.44
II.  FAITH AND REDEMPTION 
  Constitutional Redemption makes us alert 
to both of these possibilities and provides resources for championing 
a more just constitutional order. 
Rotten constitutional bargains challenge the project of constitu-
tional redemption.  Persons who make rotten constitutional bargains 
make pledges to accommodate injustice.  A strong case can be made 
that such agreements should be revised, renegotiated, or repudiated, 
not redeemed.  Rather than redeem the promises the Framers made 
to slaveholders in 1787, Americans should have striven for the “new 
birth of freedom” Abraham Lincoln promised in the Gettysburg Ad-
dress.45
The way in which Balkin and Levinson tie faith and redemption 
suggests that constitutions, at least the Constitution of the United 
States, have internal resources that permit adherents to transform the 
constitutional order without abandoning the central commitments of 
the original constitutional bargain.  To have faith in the Constitution 
or in a religious tradition, in their view, is to believe the object of that 
  Contemporary proponents of gender equality are best de-
scribed as committed to interpreting narrowly rather than redeeming 
in full the promises Iraqis made to religious fundamentalists in 2005. 
 
 43. See Graber, supra note 21, at 58. 
 44. See DAVID KAIRYS, “FREEDOM OF SPEECH,” THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE 
CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., Basic Books 3d ed. 1998); Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The 
Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 32, 
109–16 (1993). 
 45. Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in THE SPEECHES OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: INCLUDING INAUGURALS AND PROCLAMATIONS 368, 368 (G. Mercer 
Adam ed., 1906).  The Gettysburg Address was given at the dedication of the Gettysburg 
National Cemetery four months after the Battle of Gettysburg.   
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faith is the path or a path to the good, the true, and the beautiful, or 
at least the significantly better.  “One must believe,” Balkin writes, 
that, on the whole, the institute is a good thing, and not a 
bad thing, and that to further its purposes is also, on the 
whole, a good thing, and not a bad thing.  Even if particular 
actions one does on behalf of the institution are personally 
troubling, one must believe that, in the long run, hewing to 
one’s institutional role means that thing will work out for 
the best.46
Balkin has faith in the Constitution of the United States because 
he believes social movements can successfully invoke constitutional 
principles to keep abortion legal, grant same-sex couples the right to 
marry, and provide all Americans with adequate health care.  Levin-
son signed the Constitution in 1988 because Frederick Douglass be-
lieved that the text could be interpreted as mandating the abolition of 
slavery.  He lost faith in the constitutional order when he perceived 
unredeemable internal deficiencies in constitutional institutions that 
he regards as more likely to lead the nation off a cliff than to the 
promised land. 
 
This perfectionist interpretation of constitutional faith and re-
demption seems false to several crucial components of the constitu-
tional experience, in particular the constitutional experience with rot-
ten bargains.  First, persons who make rotten constitutional bargains 
may be primarily concerned with improving their situation in the 
present, not achieving some distant goal in the future.  Rotten consti-
tutional bargains enable persons who disagree on some matters to 
cooperate on others.  Constitutional redemption is, therefore, best 
measured by whether accommodating the constitutional evil enables 
persons to successfully cooperate on matters in which an agreement 
can be reached.  Second, constitutions are joint enterprises between 
actual people.  The Constitution of the United States could not have 
been ratified if crucial participants in the United States announced 
that the text was best interpreted as compelling emancipation.  The 
crucial constitutional issue is whether a constitution establishes a re-
gime that most persons find tolerable, particularly in light of feasible 
alternatives, than one they find perfect.47
Whether faith and redemption require the possibility of perfec-
tion or substantial improvement is contestable.  People often have 
 
 
 46. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 124. 
 47. See generally Mark A. Graber, Our (Im)Perfect Constitution, 51 REV. POLITICS 86 
(1989). 
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faith in very imperfect things.  We speak of the faithful fans of very 
bad sports teams.  The participants in royal weddings during the Mid-
dle Ages did not expect modern forms of marital bliss when they 
pledged faith to each other.  By understanding how many sports fans 
and medieval queens experienced faith and redemption, we may gain 
a broader perspective on constitutional faith and redemption in our 
time. 
A.  Redeeming the Kansas City Royals and Medieval Marriages 
Baseball fans in Balkin’s native Kansas City experience faith and 
fidelity without the possibility of redemption, at least as redemption is 
understood in Constitutional Redemption.  The faithful fans of the Kan-
sas City Royals have witnessed years of futility without any realistic 
chance of winning the World Series.48
Baseball fans are considered faithful only when they remain loyal 
to the team when redemption seems impossible.  They do not leave in 
the fifth inning when the team is already down nine runs.  They are 
critical of those who give away tickets to “meaningless” games.  While 
they sometimes talk about that star third baseman deep in the Royals 
minor league system, their faith and fidelity is unrelated to any confi-
dence that the Royals will in the future be much better.  Indeed, 
sports fans are considered to be faithful to the extent that their beha-
vior is completely unrelated to the present and future prospects of the 
object of their faith. 
  They nevertheless demonstrate 
their fidelity by enduring near-freezing weather every September to 
see their team compete against another squad, both of whom were 
mathematically eliminated from the pennant race weeks ago, knowing 
that any good young player they might see will in the near future ei-
ther be traded to the Boston Red Sox or purchased as a free agent by 
the New York Yankees.  Perhaps such fans hope that, one day, the 
Royals will indeed win the World Series or at least win more games 
than they lose.  Still, hardly any would say that most Kansas Royal fans 
have faith in a future in which the Royals are consistently one of the 
better teams in baseball.  Nor do most fans of perennially bad athletic 
teams justify their faith and fidelity by pointing to the moral virtues of 
either the players or management on the hapless nine. 
Marriage provides another perspective on the complex relation-
ship between objects of faith and redemption.  Pledging faith in a 
 
 48. See Kansas City Royals, Team History & Encyclopedia, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, 
http://www.baseball-reference.com/teams/KCR/ (showing that the Royals have had only 
three winning seasons in the last twenty years, and none since 2003). 
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marriage partner is far more presentist than Balkin or Levinson’s con-
stitutional faith.  Actresses in the musical comedy “Guys and Dolls”  
may sing, “marry the man today, and change his ways tomorrow,” but 
marriage counselors consistently maintain that one should not walk 
down the aisle expecting one’s spouse to become a completely differ-
ent person in the foreseeable future.  Of course, marriage partners 
expect their spouses to change as they age for the simple reason that 
people change when they age.  Nevertheless, unless one is a character 
in an English romance novel, one should only get married to a person 
one believes is a decent person, not a person one believes over time 
might become a decent person. 
What constitutes redemption in marriage has changed.  When 
Eleanor of Acquitaine pledged faith to Louis VII of France and, later, 
Henry Plantagenet, she was making a very different set of commit-
ments than most contemporary American couples do when they 
pledge faith to each other.49
The examples of baseball and marriage suggest that faith and re-
demption are linked to the purpose of an enterprise, that the purpos-
es of various enterprises may be contested, and that those purposes 
often change over time.  Some baseball fans retain their faith only 
when they can truly say “wait ’til next year.”  Others find their faith 
redeemed, perversely, by a lifetime of near and spectacular misses.  
Some persons’ faith in their marriage partner is redeemed when they 
or their children obtain a certain status.  For others, faith is redeemed 
by a lifetime of love.  Faith may be rooted in present realities or future 
prospects.  One may pledge faith to the handsome or beautiful per-
son before them or to the person who has the prospect of being the 
ruler of England or a senior partner at a prominent law firm.  Faith 
may or may not have an element of perfection.  One may cheer for a 
team because they have particularly promising young players or simp-
ly because that is the hometown team. 
  The faith medieval queens had in their 
marriages was not tested when the king had a mistress.  This, one sus-
pects, was to be expected.  Rather that faith was redeemed when their 
eldest surviving son, not a son of those other women, took the throne 
upon the king’s death.  By comparison, contemporary couples em-
phasize sexual fidelity and love far more than the participants in past-
arranged royal marriages. 
 
 49. For a good biography of Eleanor of Aquitaine, see MARION MEADE, ELEANOR OF 
ACQUITAINE: A BIOGRAPHY (1991).  For a good account of the changing status of love and 
sexual fidelity in marriage, see STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: FROM 
OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY, OR HOW LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE (2005). 
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A constitutional faith that resembled the faith of Kansas City 
Royal baseball fans, medieval queens, or contemporary newlyweds 
would be redeemed quite differently than what Balkin and Levinson 
consider constitutional redemption.  A constitutional faith inspired by 
faithful Kansas City Royal fans would simply accept the Constitution as 
is, with all the warts.  Redemption would simply come with the sense 
of belonging experienced by those persons who say, “my country, 
right or wrong.”  A constitutional faith inspired by medieval queens 
would be experienced more as a duty, with a possible payoff, than an 
aspiration to a more perfect marriage.  A constitutional faith inspired 
by newlyweds would focus more on present virtues than future possi-
bilities.   
B.  Redeeming the Entire Preamble 
The examples of baseball and marriage suggest that whether 
constitutional faith involves the eventual redemption of really rotten 
bargains depends on the point of the constitutional enterprise.  Bal-
kin agrees.  He is “interested in the question of what attitude mem-
bers of the public must have toward the constitutional project in or-
der for it to be legitimate.”50  For Balkin, the point of the 
constitutional enterprise is justice.  “Citizens,” he claims, must “have 
the resources necessary to move the Constitution closer to their idea 
of what their Constitution means and should mean.”51  Redemption 
occurs when the rotten constitutional bargains of the past are un-
done, either by interpretation or amendment.  From the perspective 
offered by Constitutional Evil, the point of the constitutional enterprise 
is to enable people who disagree over fundamental political principles 
to nevertheless share civic space.52
The constitutional obligation to live with evil can be derived from 
basic purposes of the constitutional enterprise.  Constitutions serve 
many purposes.  Constitutions provide government officials with ne-
cessary power and organize politics, enable governments to make 
credible commitments to investors and foreign powers, prevent gov-
  The constitutional challenge is 
getting people who disagree on the nature of the just society to coo-
perate for other constitutional purposes.  Redemption occurs when 
people who disagree on certain basic questions are nevertheless able 
to provide for the common defense, insure domestic tranquility, and 
achieve other constitutional goals. 
 
 50. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 1. 
 51. Id. at 10. 
 52. See GRABER, supra note 3, at 9. 
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ernment officials from enriching and entrenching themselves, pro-
mote deliberation on the public interest, enable a society to realize 
national aspirations, and facilitate compromises among persons who 
disagree on national aspirations.53
Consider the important role constitutions play in organizing pol-
itics.  All political rules require some preexisting rules that enable 
people to identify the laws and who gets to make the law.  One cannot 
have an election without having rules for how the election is to be 
conducted.
  Some of these constitutional pur-
poses are closely related to justice.  Others are not.  Constitutional 
faith and redemption must incorporate those constitutional commit-
ments unrelated to justice, many of which require accommodations 
for injustice. 
54  The Constitution of the United States from this pers-
pective is redeemed to the extent people believe the rules for electing 
the president usually identify clear presidential winners.  Judged by 
this standard, constitutional faith has typically been rewarded.  The 
constitutional rules for determining the winner of presidential elec-
tions generated a clear winner in fifty-one of the fifty-five elections 
held between 1788 and the present.  One can make a good case for 
including the 1800 and 1824 elections, since both were resolved by a 
straightforward application of the provisions governing what happens 
when no candidate gains a majority of the Electoral College.  Only the 
1876 and 2000 elections raised constitutional issues that could not be 
clearly resolved by reference to consensus readings of the constitu-
tional text.55
Claims that the constitutional rules for presidential elections are 
unfair, undemocratic, or do not promote the election of particularly 
good presidents
   
56
 
 53. This paragraph relies heavily on HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER & KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 7–10 (2013).  For a fuller development, 
see MARK A. GRABER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: A NEW INTRODUCTION (forthcom-
ing 2013). 
 are both fair and potentially beside the point.  The 
Electoral College is clearly inconsistent with a putative constitutional 
commitment to democracy, but not a putative constitutional com-
mitment to rule by law.  If the only constitutional goal is to have mi-
nimally democratic rules that consistently generate clear winners in 
presidential elections, then the Constitution of the United States has 
been redeemed.   
 54. See Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).  
 55. See ARTHUR MEIER SCHLESINGER, JR., GIL TROY & FRED L. ISRAEL, HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1789–2008  (2011). 
 56. See LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 11, at 186–90. 
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Balkin and Levinson both regard fundamental constitutional 
purposes as set out in the Preamble to the Constitution.  The Pream-
ble asserts:  
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more 
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, 
provide for the common defence, promote the general Wel-
fare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our 
Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the 
United States of America.57
Balkin maintains, “The Preamble to the Constitution sets a purpose 
that has never been fully achieved but is our duty to achieve.”
  
58  
“[T]he Preamble,” he later asserts, “announces a political project of 
self-government that spans generations.”59 Levinson agrees that the 
Preamble is the best guide to the point of the constitutional enter-
prise.  He writes, “the best way to address the Constitution of Settle-
ment is to ask how well it does (or does not) work to achieve the con-
stitution’s purposes, and preambles are the first place one would look 
to find out what the ostensible purposes are.”60  The Preamble is one 
of the few constitutional provisions Levinson celebrates.  The most re-
cent edition of Constitutional Faith concludes, “I believe we can achieve 
the promise of American constitutionalism as set out in the Preamble, 
which does deserve our commitment, only by substantially changing 
the institutions that systematically work against the possibility of ac-
tually achieving the goals the Preamble sets out.”61
Balkin and, to as lesser extent, Levinson celebrate an edited ver-
sion of the actual Preamble.  Constitutional Redemption talks a good 
deal about the constitutional commitment to “establish justice,” but 
very little about constitutional commitments to “a more perfect Un-
ion,” “domestic Tranquility,” “the common defence,” and the “gener-
al Welfare.”  The clause, “secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves 
and our Posterity,” seems to be truncated to “secure the Blessings of 
Liberty.”  Balkin’s primary concern is with justice, with “whether [con-
stitutional] fidelity is undesirable because it co-opts us into the main-
tenance of an unjust order.”
 
62
 
 57. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
  Levinson’s most recent work, Framed, 
spends more energy elaborating the constitutional commitment to 
justice than other constitutional purposes announced by the Pream-
 58. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 5. 
 59. Id. at 51. 
 60. LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 11, at 55. 
 61. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 1, at 252. 
 62. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 107. 
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ble.  He notes that preambles “often use abstract, even grandiose 
words articulating value commitments like justice and liberty.”63
Faith in the constitutional commitment to “the common de-
fence” differs in numerous ways from faith in the constitutional com-
mitments to establish justice.  General agreement exists on what con-
stitutes providing for the common defense.   The Constitution of the 
United States provides for the common defense to the extent that the 
government is able to prevent foreign invasion, protect Americans 
abroad, and, perhaps, prevent domestic crime, although that latter 
goal may be an element of “the general Welfare” or “domestic Tran-
quility.”  Disagreements are confined to the best means for achieving 
these consensual ends.  What constitutes establishing justice is more 
contested.  Americans largely agree on how elected officials might go 
about recognizing same-sex marriage.  They dispute whether a statute 
recognizing same-sex marriage is just.  Unlike establishing justice, 
providing for the common defense is not an aspirational goal, a pur-
pose the Constitution hopes to achieve gradually over time.  A consti-
tution must provide for the common defense immediately upon rati-
fication.  Constitutional orders collapse when the regime is overrun 
by a foreign invader.
  We 
do not learn much about the consequences of constitutional fidelity 
for the “common defence” or the other goals stated in the Preamble, 
at least to the extent those goals are not mere rephrasing of the con-
stitutional commitment to justice. 
64
The constitutional commitment to the common defense often 
conflicts with the constitutional commitment to establish justice.  Ab-
raham Lincoln articulated this tension at the beginning of the Civil 
War when he justified the suspension of habeas corpus, in part, by as-
serting that military necessity outweighed individual rights.  His July 4, 
1861, address to Congress asserted: 
  Faith in the constitutional capacity for provid-
ing for the common defense in the United States is far better de-
scribed as a hope that past constitutional successes will be maintained 
than, as with the case with the constitutional commitment to establish 
justice, that past failings will be overcome. 
The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully 
executed, were being resisted, and failing of execution, in 
nearly one-third of the States. Must they be allowed to finally 
fail of execution, even had it been perfectly clear, that by the 
 
 63. LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 11, at 55. 
 64. See ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF 
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 118 (2009). 
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use of the means necessary to their execution, some single 
law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty, 
that practically, it relieves more of the guilty, than of the in-
nocent, should, to a very limited extent, be violated? To state 
the question more directly, are all the laws, but one, to go 
unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that 
one be violated? Even in such a case, would not the official 
oath be broken, if the government should be overthrown, 
when it was believed that disregarding the single law, would 
tend to preserve it?65
Justice Robert Jackson spoke on this tension between constitutional 
purposes when, in Terminello v. City of Chicago, he bluntly criticized the 
Supreme Court for making decisions that threatened to “convert the 
constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”
 
66
Faith in the constitutional commitment to “domestic Tranquility” 
seems more like faith in the constitutional commitment to the com-
mon defense than faith in the constitutional commitment to establish 
justice.  General agreement exists on the basic parameters of domestic 
tranquility.  Societies experience civic peace when all crucial factions 
in the regime have no desire to disrupt a normal politics that serves 
their diverse interests and values to a fair degree.  Constitutions func-
tion only when they secure or improve domestic tranquility almost 
immediately after ratification.  Compared to other constitutions, the 
Constitution of the United States has successfully insured domestic 
tranquility in the past, with the Civil War and massive resistance to the 
civil rights movement being important exceptions.  Polarization may 
challenge American constitutional faith because the intensity of parti-
san divisions threatens the loss of constitutional benefits previously 
enjoyed rather than the possibility of constitutional benefits yet to be 
experienced. 
   
Efforts to redeem faith in a constitution that insures domestic 
tranquility are likely to conflict with efforts to redeem faith in a con-
stitution that establishes justice.  Crucial factions will not secede or 
disrupt normal politics only when their vital interests are satisfied to a 
fair degree.  Americans with very bad values will risk the stability of 
the regime when they perceive their political rivals are too intent on 
establishing justice at the cost of other constitutional goods.  Slave-
holders threatened not to form union and later seceded when they 
 
 65. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, in 4 COLLECTED WORKS 
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 430 (1951). 
 66. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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felt property in human beings unduly threatened.  Racists disrupted 
southern and local politics after Brown v. Board of Education67
The “privileged position of business”
 under-
mined Jim Crow.   
68 in American constitution-
al politics illustrates various tensions in American constitutional pur-
poses.  According to Charles Lindblom, who coined the phrase, gov-
ernment must “take action to secure the profitability and prosperity of 
the private sector” because national prosperity in a market economy is 
“dependent upon the profitability and prosperity of the private sec-
tion.”69  The resulting commercial prosperity is one of the blessings of 
liberty that is a core purpose of American constitutionalism.70  Com-
mercial prosperity can be realized, however, only at the cost of politi-
cal equality, another core purpose of American constitutionalism.71  
Steven Elkin asserts, “Controllers of large-scale productive assets will, 
must, and ought to have substantial discretion in how these assets are 
to be employed . . . .  The result of this discretion is also inevitable: 
the privileged political voice of large-scale controllers of capital.”72
William Lloyd Garrison asserted a more general truth when he 
claimed the Constitution of the United States was “a covenant with 
death, and an agreement with hell.”
  If 
this analysis is correct, then one’s faith in a constitution that promotes 
economic well-being can be redeemed in the foreseeable future only 
by postponing or relaxing efforts to redeem faith in the democratic 
commitments of American constitutionalism. 
73
 
 67. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
  The constitutions of commer-
cial republicans are consequences of rotten constitutional bargains.  
Citizens sacrifice fundamental values when forming constitutional re-
gimes because constitutions are at least as much instruments for 
enabling people with very different understandings of justice to ob-
tain ordinary political goods as they are vehicles for achieving the just 
society.  People adopt constitutions because they have faith that the 
government they establish will protect them from foreign invaders, 
grow the economy, deter and punish criminals, offer basic education, 
 68. CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD’S POLITICAL 
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 173 (1977). 
 69. Id. at 175. 
 70. See ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18–35 
(1980). 
 71. See GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA 38 
(1992). 
 72. STEPHEN L. ELKIN, RECONSTRUCTING THE COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC: 
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AFTER MADISON 58–59 (2006). 
 73. See supra note 8. 
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and prevent potentially hostile factions from killing each other in 
street.  In order to secure all of these mundane political goals in the 
circumstances of politics, governments must inevitably adopt policies 
that many, perhaps, most citizens think unjust.  Business must be ac-
commodated to some degree.  Regional interests must be satisfied.  
When making these agreements with hell, the only question for ordi-
nary citizens is which demon they must bargain with and how much 
those devils are due. 
This rumination on the Preamble to the Constitution highlights 
how constitutional faith and redemption require fidelity to and reali-
zation of numerous constitutional purposes.  Americans do not dem-
onstrate constitutionality fidelity when the single-minded seek to es-
tablish justice at the expense of such other constitutional purposes as 
the common defense and domestic tranquility.  The single-minded 
pursuit of the common defense or domestic tranquility is for the same 
reason antithetical to constitutional fidelity and redemption.  Rather, 
Americans must delicately balance constitutional purposes as they 
seek to perfect the regime announced in the Preamble.  At times, the 
constitutional faithful will actively seek to redeem evil.  Moreover, 
constitutional faith and fidelity require finding ways to accommodate 
and live with those citizens whose practices we find abhorrent. 
III.  PROPHETS AND POLITICIANS 
Prophets and politicians enjoy uneasy relationships.  Prophets 
committed to establishing justice regularly condemn politicians who 
routinely make rotten and really rotten bargains.  Politicians commit-
ted to insuring domestic tranquility regularly condemn prophets for 
disturbing the peace.  Socrates is the most famous example of a 
prophet executed by politicians.  The secular prophets who led the 
French Revolution returned the favor by executing numerous politi-
cians. 
The prophets who lead social movements are the heroes of Con-
stitutional Faith and Constitutional Redemption.  As noted above, Levin-
son was initially willing to sign the Constitution because Frederick 
Douglass was willing to sign the Constitution.  Douglass’s prophetic 
claim that the Constitution of 1787 was anti-slavery, Levinson states, 
“is an excellent example of how the principle of charity operates,” for 
the “point of American constitutionalism, if we are indeed to have any 
‘faith’ in its goodness, must be to achieve a political order worthy of 
respect.”74
 
 74. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 
  Balkin celebrates Douglass and Martin Luther King, Jr., 
1, at 77. 
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for “attempting to hold white Americans responsible for the promises 
they made in the Constitution.”  Both prophets were “attempting to 
collect on a moral debt . . . created at the founding of the United 
States.”75
By shifting the boundaries of the reasonable and the plausible, 
they open up space for new forms of constitutional imagination and 
new forms of constitutional utopianism, both for good and for ill.  
They change both the sense of what is practically possible and the 
sense of what it is possible to imagine.
  Unsurprisingly, Balkin regards the social movements that 
such persons as Douglass and King led as the crucial engines of con-
stitutional redemption.  “This is why social and political movements 
are so important,” he writes. 
76
Politicians are the (tragic) heroes in Dred Scott and the Problem of 
Constitutional Evil.  The book details how constitutional institutions 
were structured in ways that prevented political centrists with worka-
ble programs for accommodating constitutional evil, most notably 
Millard Fillmore, from capturing the presidency.
 
77  The infamous last 
chapter suggests that Americans in the national election of 1860 
should have voted for John Bell, the ordinary politician who made 
rotten and really rotten constitutional bargains in an effort to pre-
serve a constitutional regime, over Abraham Lincoln, the secular 
prophet who led a social movement committed to redeeming the 
Constitution from injustice.  In sharp contrast to contemporary “Lin-
coln voters” who “promise Americans a ‘justice-seeking’ constitutio-
nalism,” contemporary “Bell voters” treat “constitutions primarily as 
vehicles for preserving the peace among persons who have very dif-
ferent visions of the good society, a robust democracy, and the rule of 
law.”78
Frederick Douglass and John Bell reflect, respectively, the pro-
phetical and political understandings of constitutional faith and re-
demption.  Douglass and the prophets who lead or aspire to lead so-
cial movements are on a quest to make their vision of the just society 
the official goal of the land.  Convinced of their rectitude, prophets 
seek to convince enough fellow citizens of the goodness of their vision 
to gain the political power necessary to rid the polity of constitutional 
evil.  This prophetic constitution, like Balkin’s and most contempo-
rary constitutional theorists, is primarily committed to establishing 
justice.  John Bell and the ordinarily politicians regularly make rotten 
 
 
 75. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 122–23.   
 76. Id. at 11. 
 77. GRABER, supra note 3, at 164–65. 
 78. Id. at 252–53. 
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and really rotten constitutional bargains because they work in an en-
vironment in which no prophet or social movement has successfully 
established the political consensus necessary to make any particular 
vision of the just society the law of the land.  Their political task is to 
convince rival factions to accept half a loaf, often much less, in order 
that citizens can continue to enjoy the blessings of a stable political 
order.  The political constitution places as much if not more emphasis 
on the constitutional commitments to establish a more perfect union, 
provide for the common defense, and insure domestic tranquility as 
the constitutional commitment to establish justice. 
Some harmonic convergence may nevertheless be possible.  Bal-
kin, Levinson, and I are happy exceptions to the historically difficult 
relationship between prophets and politicians.  We have enjoyed a 
rewarding friendship for decades, even though Balkin and Levinson 
speak in the prophetic voice, while I prefer the voice of the ordinary 
politician.  Constitutional Redemption recognizes that the redemptive 
process in the United States is political.  Prophets change the consti-
tutional culture “through political activism and legal advocacy.”79 Dred 
Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil maintains that good politi-
cians clear vital spaces for prophecy.  The choices people make in a 
society that insures domestic tranquility and provides for the common 
defense, that work concludes, “are likely to promote justice in the 
long run.”80
Society needs both prophets and politicians.  A society without 
prophets is blind to injustice and indifferent to improvement.  A so-
ciety without politicians lacks the stability necessary to achieve any vi-
sion of the good regime.  Contemporary constitutional theory has 
done a wonderful job illuminating how Americans might achieve the 
prophetic constitutional commitment to establish justice and is be-
ginning to explore how Americans may achieve more mundane con-
stitutional commitments to provide for the common defense and in-
sure domestic tranquility.  The challenge for the next generation of 
constitutional thinkers inspired by Constitutional Faith and Constitu-
tional Redemption is to offer Americans better guidance on how they 
might simultaneously realize constitutional commitments that require 
them to both live with and redeem constitutional evil. 
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